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I. To DISMISS OR NOT To DISMISS: THE LATEST
INTERPRETATIONAL CONFLICT FACING BANKRUPTCY
COURTS IN ADMINISTERING CHAPTER

13

CASES

Section 1307(b) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the
"Code") commands courts to dismiss chapter 13 cases upon request of
the debtor. This provision currently conflicts with Code § 1307(c),
which gives the court the discretion to convert a debtor's chapter 13
case to a chapter 7 bankruptcy case for specifically enumerated debtor
misdeeds. Specifically, must the court dismiss a chapter 13 case upon
the debtor's request even when there is a pending motion to convert
the same? Bankruptcy courts are noticeably split on this question,
with a slight majority holding that the court must dismiss even if a
motion to convert is pending. The minority approach to this issue,
holding that the court does not have to grant a debtor's motion to
dismiss when there is a pending motion to convert, arouses the need
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to investigate how courts should resolve this issue. The plain meaning
doctrine and its application to the wording of Code § 1307(b) and (c),
Congress's stated intent that chapter 13 be completely voluntary, and
the existence of other remedies to cure the debtor's abuse of the
bankruptcy process point to a sensible resolution to the problem.
When courts are faced with a debtor's motion to dismiss pursuant to
Code § 1307(b), they must grant the motion even if there is a pending
motion to convert under Code § 1307(c).

II.

BACKGROUND OF CHAPTER
REORGANIZATION"

13 "WAGE EARNER

OF THE UNITED STATES

BANKRUPTCY CODE

Chapter 13 is a unique chapter of the Code in that it is, and has
been since the time of its inception, primarily limited to consumers
and purely voluntary.' Certain problems with chapter 13 arose during
its history, and large-scale changes were made to it in 1978 and in
2005.2 Chapter 13 has several distinct advantages over chapter 7 liquidation, which can be voluntary or involuntary. Chapter 13 allows the
debtor to keep all of his property,3 including certain property encumbered by a lien;4 chapter 13 affords protection to non-bankrupt codebtors as well as the principal debtor; 5 and chapter 13 gives the
debtor an unconditional right to opt out of his case at any time unless
he has converted to chapter 13 from another chapter.6
A.

Brief History of Chapter 13

The amendments included in the Chandler Act of 1938 added chapter X111 7 "Wage Earner Reorganization" to the Bankruptcy Act of
1898 (the "Bankruptcy Act").' In addition to being completely voluntary, no provision of chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act would disqualify a debtor for "straight" bankruptcy relief (the equivalent to
today's chapter 7 liquidation).9 Basically, at chapter XIII's enactment
1. Samuel L. Bufford & Erwin Chemerinsky, ConstitutionalProblems in the 2005
Bankruptcy Amendments, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 30 (2008).
2. See 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1300.03 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th rev. ed. 2009) [hereinafter COLLIER]; Ed Flynn & Phil Crewson, Data
Show Trends in Post-BAPCPA Filings, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July-Aug. 2008, at 14.
3. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2009).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1) (2006).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) (2006).
7. "Chapter XIII" refers to the former Chapter 13 prior to the 1978 amendments
to the Bankruptcy Act. Bufford & Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 31.
8. Id. at 30.
9. Id. (explaining that Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, as introduced in
1938, would not disqualify consumers for relief in the form of liquidation proceedings.
In 1960, Congress attempted to amend the Bankruptcy Act by denying bankruptcy
relief in the form of liquidation proceedings to any debtor that qualified for a Chapter
XIII relief. Id. This proposal would potentially exacerbate existing problems with
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in 1898, it was a completely voluntary alternative for individual debtors who could otherwise choose bankruptcy relief in the form of asset
liquidation.1" Chapter XIII facilitated adjustments of individual debts
for the debtor with a regular income through an extension of payment
plans of pre-petition debt.11 The debtor would generally be able to
repay under such plans with future income under the protection of the
court. 12 Protection of the creditors was promoted through the application of ratable recoveries that would otherwise not be available in a
liquidation bankruptcy proceeding.13
In 1978, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act, which included chapter 13 amended from the previous chapter XIII.4 In the
amended chapter 13, Congress made substantial revisions.15 A principal feature of the amended chapter 13 is the debtor's right to dismiss
the case "at any time, if the case has not been converted under sections 706, 1112, or 1208 of this title. 1 16 Congress added 1 7 this provision because, as House and Senate reports indicate, there would be
involuntary servitude implications in chapter 13 if the debtor could
not freely opt out.18
Congress's most recent large-scale change to the Bankruptcy Reform Act came in 2005 when it passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA").1 9 BAPCPA purports to
prevent abuse of the bankruptcy process by steering away from chapter 7 liquidation proceedings those debtors that have the ability to pay
at least a portion of their debts. Specifically, Congress imposed the
"means test" in Code § 707(b).2 ° Based on a complex formula, if a
debtor's income is above the median for his state, he may be ineligible 2 ' to seek relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.22 The
Chapter XIII because it forced an individual to work for his creditors, possibly violating the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude. Id.).
10. See id.
11. COLLIER, supra note 2,
12. Id.
13. Id.

$ 1300.02.

14. Id. 1300.03.
15. Bufford & Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 31.
16. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1307(b) (2006); see also Bufford & Chemerinsky, supra note 1,
at 31.
17. See Bankruptcy Amendments and the Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
98-353, § 527, 98 Stat. 389 (1984). In 1984, Congress amended the provision allowing
the debtor to dismiss voluntarily at any point, it inserted a comma after "time" so the
provision would read, "On request of the debtor at any time,

. .

.the court shall

dismiss a case under this chapter." Id.
18. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 120 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6080.
19. Flynn & Crewson, supra note 2, at 14.
20. Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An EmpiricalStudy of
Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 352 & n.17 (2008).

21. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2009). If the debtor's income is
above the median for his state, a presumption of abuse arises which the debtor must
overcome in order to seek relief under chapter 7.
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idea behind the "means test" is that if the debtor's income is above an
amount calculated on a state-by-state basis, he is presumed to be able
to pay his debts under a chapter 13 plan or outside of the bankruptcy
system.2 3 Congress intended to increase the proportion of chapter 13
filings to chapter 7 filings. 24 Despite BAPCPA's aims on preventing
abuse of the bankruptcy process, it did not alter the voluntary nature
of chapter 13. Specifically, BAPCPA did not do away with or alter
the debtor's right to dismiss his case voluntarily whenever he desires.2 6
B.

Advantages of Chapter 13

Even though the 2005 BAPCPA legislation eliminated several advantages of a chapter 13 filing as compared to a chapter 7, there remain several reasons why a consumer debtor would want to file under
chapter 13 rather than under chapter 7. The first and most obvious
reason is that the debtor in a chapter 13 case retains possession of his
property whereas in a chapter 7 case, "property of the estate '27 is distributed to the creditors. 28 The debtor in chapter 13 may even keep
certain property encumbered by a lien or other secured interest. 29 If a
secured creditor has a lien on the debtor's property that is not his
residence 30 or personal use vehicle incurred more than one year
before the bankruptcy filing, and the lien is not a purchase money
loan incurred within 910 days of filing, the court may force a repayment plan over the creditor's objection, so long as the plan promises
the creditor the present value of the property. 31 A chapter 13 debtor
cannot strip the value of a lien on his residence, but he can force a
plan on his creditor that will allow him to cure his pre-petition default
over a "reasonable time."'3 2 If, for example, the debtor missed three
mortgage payments of $700 before he filed his chapter 13 petition and
the terms of the mortgage provide that such a default will make the
entire loan balance due immediately, the court may force, through a
plan, the mortgage creditor to allow the debtor to cure the $2,100 de22. Id.; but see 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(D) (enumerating the exceptions to section
707 means testing).
23. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i).
24. Lawless, supra note 20, at 352.
25. Bufford & Chemerinksy, supra note 1, at 32.
26. Id.
27. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009) (providing that interests in property held prior to the filing of the (chapter 7) bankruptcy petition, whether held solely
by the debtor or jointly, excluding interests enumerated section 541(b), become property of the estate).
28. 11 U.S.C.A. § 726(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2009).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2006).
30. Id. § 1322(b)(2). 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) only excepts interests in real property
that is the debtor's principal residence from the "cram-down" plan modification of
§ 1325. Interests in real property not the debtor's principal residence are subject to
cram-down plan modification by the debtor. Id.
31. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(a)(9) (West Supp. 2009).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).
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fault and maintain the mortgage by continuing usual monthly payments.3 3 If the debtor chooses to continue making usual payments on
his home mortgage and cure the default over a reasonable time, he
may remain in his home.3 4 In a chapter 7 bankruptcy, all of the
debtor's non-exempt assets are transferred to the estate and distrib'35
uted by the trustee to the creditors as "property of the estate.
Most, if not all states as well as the federal government provide for a
homestead exemption to a certain amount ranging from about $2,500
to unlimited.36 Generally, exempt homestead property cannot be
made property of the estate. 37 BAPCPA, however, limited this exemption by carving out the amount of allowed exempt property according to the debtor's disposition of non-exempt property and placed
a $125,000 cap on value added to the homestead or a new homestead
purchased within 1,215 days before filing.38
Another reason that the consumer debtor would want to file under
chapter 13 as opposed to chapter 7 is that chapter 13 applies protection through an automatic stay for both the debtor and the non-bankrupt co-debtors.39 While Code § 362 restrains creditors from
attempting to collect from the actual debtor, Code § 1301 restrains
creditors from attempting to collect from a co-debtor.4 ° Code § 1301
affords protection for co-debtors if the debt is a consumer debt and
the co-debtor is not in the credit business.4 1 Chapter 7 has no analogue to Code § 1301, meaning only Code § 362 is available to provide
protection from collection attempts to the debtor, while creditors are
42
free to attempt to collect from any non-bankrupt co-debtors.
The most important reason, for the purposes of this comment, that a
debtor would want to file under chapter 13 as opposed to chapter 7, is
in chapter 13, the court "shall dismiss on request of the debtor at any
time," whereas in chapter 7, the debtor may dismiss his case only "for
cause." 43 The court has much discretion in determining whether to
allow the debtor to dismiss his chapter 7 case,4 4 whereas any such discretion, arguably does not exist for the court when the chapter 13
33. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY AND RELATED LAW IN A NUTSHELL 386
(7th ed. 2005).
34. Id.
35. 11 U.S.C. §1307(b) (2006).
36. US Legal Forms, Homestead Exemptions and Forms: State Laws, http://www.
uslegalforms.com/realestate/homestead/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
37. EPSTEIN, supra note 33, at 178.
38. Id.
39. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1), 1301(a) (2006).
40. EPSTEIN, supra note 33, at 369.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 1301(a).
42. EPSTEIN, supra note 33, at 393.
43. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1307(b), 707 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009).
44. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (enumerating the reasons for which a court may dismiss
a chapter 7 case).
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debtor has made a motion to dismiss under Code § 1307(b). 45 The
debtor's ability to dismiss his case at any time and for any reason gives
him much more flexibility and liberty once he has actually filed his
bankruptcy petition.46 Most notably, the chapter 13 debtor can avoid
having his case converted to a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding if he is
ever unwilling to have his assets liquidated, whereas a debtor under
chapter 7 can only avoid liquidation of his assets if the court dismisses
"for cause." 47 Currently, courts struggle with the force of § 1307(b);
specifically whether or not it confers an unconditional right for the
chapter 13 debtor so long as his case had not previously been converted under Code §§ 706, 1112, or 1208.48 The slight majority of
courts hold that the debtor's right to dismiss his case under Code
§ 1307(b) is absolute short of a prior conversion, even in the face of a
creditor or U.S. Trustee's motion to convert under Code § 1307(c).4 9
A substantial minority of courts have held that when there is a pending motion to convert under Code § 1307(c) and the debtor makes a
subsequent motion to dismiss under Code § 1307(b), the court has the
discretion to weigh the debtor's motion under Code § 1307(b) with
the Code § 1307(c) motion and choose whether to convert or dismiss
the case.5 °
III.

Two RECENT CASES ILLUSTRATING THE SPLIT IN AUTHORITY:
REVEALING THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF AND IN OPPOSITION TO
THE POSITION THAT THE DEBTOR'S RIGHT TO DISMISS UNDER
CODE § 1307(b) IS UNCONDITIONAL, EVEN IN THE
FACE OF A MOTION TO CONVERT

Courts are divided over whether, under Code § 1307(b), they are
obligated to dismiss the debtor's case upon his request when a motion
to convert the case under Code § 1307(c) has been filed. 51 Code
§ 1307(b) provides, "On request of the debtor at any time, if the case
has not been converted under sections 706, 1112, or 1208 of this title,
the court shall dismiss a case under this chapter."5 2 Code § 1307(c)
provides:
On request of a party in interest or the United States trustee and
after notice and a hearing, the court may convert a case under chapter 7 of this title ... for cause, including:
45. Barbieri v. Raj Acquisition Corp. (In re Barbieri), 199 F.3d 616, 619 (2d Cir.
1999).
46. See Bufford & Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 31 (discussing how an unwilling
debtor can avoid conversion to a liquidation proceeding by being able to opt out
whenever he desires).
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).
48. Barbieri,199 F.3d at 619.
49. Id. at 620.
50. See id.
51. Id.

52. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) (2006).
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(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(2) nonpayment of any fees and charges required under chapter 123
of title 28;
(3) failure to file a plan timely under section 1321 of this title;
(4) failure to commence making timely payments under section
1326 of this title;
(5) denial of confirmation of a plan under section 1325 of this title
and denial of a request made for additional time for filing another
plan or modification of a plan;
(6) material default by the debtor with respect to a term of a confirmed plan;
(7) revocation of the order of confirmation under section 1330 of
this title, and denial of confirmation of a modified plan under section 1329 of this title;
(8) termination of a confirmed plan by reason of the occurrence of
a condition specified in the plan other than completion of payments
under the plan;
(9) only on request of the United States trustee, failure of the
debtor to file, within fifteen days, or such additional time as the
court may allow, after the filing of the petition commencing such
case, the information required by paragraph (1) of section 521;
(10) only on request of the United States trustee, failure to timely
file the information required by paragraph (2) of section 521; or
(11) failure of the debtor to pay any domestic support obligation
that first becomes payable after the date of the filing of the
petition.53
Currently, the slight majority of courts have held that they are obligated to dismiss pursuant to the debtor's motion under Code
§ 1307(b) despite a pending motion by the creditor or United States
Trustee under Code § 1307(c) generally because of the statute's
mandatory language. A substantial minority of courts essentially have
attempted to justify their position by explaining that when there is a
pending motion made by an interested party under Code § 1307(c),
they have the discretion to consider the Code § 1307(c) motion in conjunction with the debtor's motion under Code § 1307(b), and if the
case is converted to one under chapter 7, the debtor's motion is no
longer applicable.5 4
A.

The Majority Rule: In re Polly

The slight majority of courts have, when faced with conflicting motions under Code § 1307(b) and Code § 1307(c), adopted the position
espoused by the court in In re Polly." In Polly, a creditor, RealPage
Inc., ("RealPage") filed a motion to convert the debtor's chapter 13
case to one under chapter 7 pursuant to Code § 1307(c) due to alleged
53. Id. § 1307(c).
54. In re Jacobsen, 378 B.R. 805, 809 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007).
55. In re Polly, 392 B.R. 236, 239 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2008).
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acts of bad faith and for failure to file tax returns as required by Code
§ 1308.56 In response the debtor filed a motion to continue
RealPage's motion to convert, to which RealPage objected.5 7 The
court held a hearing on RealPage's motion to convert, and the
debtor's motion to continue was denied.5 8 Upon denial of the motion
to continue and after commencement of the hearing on the motion to
convert, the debtor orally moved to dismiss his case under Code
§ 1307(b), and the motion was granted. 59 RealPage filed a motion to
reconsider, claiming that the debtor did not have an absolute right to
dismiss under Code § 1307(b) because RealPage had previously made
a motion to convert under Code § 1307(c).6 ° The court resolved the
issue by examining the plain language of Code § 1307(b), the voluntary nature and legislative intent behind chapter 13, and the availability of methods to prevent abuse of the bankruptcy system other than
denying the debtor's motion to dismiss under Code § 1307(b). 61 Specifically, the court found that the word "shall" in Code § 1307(b) creates an obligation for the court to dismiss upon request by the debtor,
which is impervious to judicial discretion. 62 Also, the court reasoned
that the plain meaning of Code § 1307(b) was not "demonstrably at
odds" with congressional intent because chapter 13 was intended by
Congress to be purely voluntary.63 Finally, the court reasoned that
denying the debtor relief under § 1307(b) when there was a conflicting
motion to convert under Code § 1307(c) was not the only possible
protection against the ill-motivated debtor.6 4 Therefore, prevention
of abuse of the bankruptcy system did not require that Code § 1307(c)
be held to trump the plain meaning of Code § 1307(b).6 5
B.

The Minority Rule: In Re Rosson

A substantial minority of courts faced with conflicting motions
under Code §§ 1307(b) and (c) by the debtor and creditor respectively, have rejected the position adopted in Polly in favor of considering both motions and, if necessary, granting the motion to convert
over the debtor's motion to dismiss. 6 6 In Rosson, the debtor admittedly failed to deliver funds as directed by the court and the court
56. Id. at 238.
57. Id.
58. Id.

59. Id. (permitting an oral motion pursuant to the exception in Fed. R. Bankr. P.
9013, which requires motions to dismiss to be stated in writing except when made
during a hearing).
60. Id.

61. See id. at 243-46.
62. Id. at 239.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 245.

65. Id. at 246.
66. See, e.g., Rosson v. Fitzgerald (In re Rosson), 545 F.3d 764, 768-69 (9th Cir.
2008).
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threatened to convert the case to chapter 7 on its own motion. 67 The
docket reflects that the court converted the case to one under chapter
7, even though no formal order was entered or filed.6 8 On the same
day, the debtor filed a "Notice of Dismissal" notifying the court that
he was voluntarily dismissing his case under Code § 1307(b). 69 The
court subsequently entered an order formally converting the case to
one under chapter 7, from which the debtor appealed to the district
court.70 The order of the bankruptcy court was affirmed, and the
debtor appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.71 The Ninth
Circuit held that the debtor's right to dismiss his chapter 13 case is not
absolute, but rather was qualified by the court's power to convert a
case based on the debtor's bad-faith conduct or abuse of the bankruptcy process.72 Specifically, the court held that it had the discretion
to determine whether to grant the debtor's motion to dismiss in the
face of a motion to convert based on bad-faith conduct.73 The court
relied on the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts,7 4 holding, "even language that seems to

be mandatory upon the court is subject to the court's power to police
bad-faith and abuse of process."75
C. Apparent Weaknesses of the Minority Rule

In essence, the slight majority of courts have held that the debtor's
right to dismiss is absolute if it has not been converted from another
chapter of the code because of the plain meaning of the word "shall,"
as well as the legislative intent and voluntary nature of chapter 13.76
The main reasoning of the minority position on this issue is that the
debtor's right to dismiss is always subject to the court's power to prevent bad-faith conduct and abuse of the bankruptcy process. 7 7 However, courts applying the majority position have dealt with the
prospect of bad-faith conduct that the minority of courts claim will
follow if the debtor is able to dismiss his case when there is a pending
motion to convert. 78 Majority-positioned courts have identified other
methods to prevent bad-faith conduct and abuse of the bankruptcy
process such as lifting the debtor's protection of the automatic stay in
bankruptcy court, dismissing pursuant to Code § 1307(b) with
67. Id. at 768.

68. Id.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
1995).

Id.
Id. at 768-69.
Id.
Id. at 774.
Id. at 775.
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 127 S.Ct. 1105 (2007).
Rosson, 543 F.3d at 773 n.12.
See In re Polly, 392 B.R. 236, 239-46 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2008).
Id. at 242.
Id. at 244-45; see also In re Harper-Elder, 184 B.R. 403, 404 (Bankr. D.D.C.
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prejudice to refiling, exercising continuing control of the debtor's
property of the estate pursuant to Code § 349(b)(3), imposing sanctions for misconduct pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011, and referring the debtor for criminal prosecution for
bankruptcy fraud. 9 These methods are discussed at greater length in
this article.
Finally, courts espousing the minority position now rely heavily on
the recent Supreme Court decision in Marrama.8 0 Their reliance is
misplaced because Marramadeals with Code § 706(a), which provides
that a debtor "may convert a case under [chapter 7] to a case under
chapter 13," and the decision only gives the court the power to shortcircuit the two-step process of converting a case to chapter 13 under
81
Code § 706(a) and reconverting the case under Code § 1307(c).
Marrama only allows the court to deny the Code § 706(a) request
based on bad-faith conduct because the court could re-convert the
case back to chapter 7 pursuant to Code § 1307(c).82 The court does
not have such discretion with a motion to dismiss under Code
§ 1307(b). 83
The majority position is more in line with the plain language of the
statute, legislative intent, and the structure of chapter 13. The majority position is also more viable given the availability to courts of remedies for bad-faith conduct and abuse of the bankruptcy process. In
short, the court should have no discretion in this matter.
IV.

THE PLAIN MEANING OF CODE

§ 1307(b):

"UPON REQUEST

OF THE DEBTOR AT ANY TIME, THE
COURT SHALL

A.

DISMISS."

The Plain Meaning Doctrine

In United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., the Supreme Court
held "the plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive except in
rare cases in which the literal application of the statute will produce a
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters. 8s4 The
Court in Ron Pair reasoned that, over the course of a decade, Congress substantially overhauled the bankruptcy system, and it would be
unrealistic to expect Congress to explain with particularity, each step
it took. 85 Therefore, as long as the statutory scheme is coherent and
consistent, it is generally unnecessary to inquire beyond the plain lan79. Polly, 392 B.R. 245-46.
80. Id. at 246.
81. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 371, 127 S. Ct 1105, 1109-10
(2007).
82. Id. at 1010-11.
83. Polly, 392 B.R. at 246.
84. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
85. Id. at 240.
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guage of the statute.86 In resolving a dispute over the meaning of a
provision in the Code, the inquiry should begin with the language of
the statute itself and unless the meaning is ambiguous or clearly at
odds with congressional intent, the inquiry should end with such
language.87
The Supreme Court further articulated its commitment to the plain
meaning of the Code in Lamie v. United States Trustee.88 The Court
reasoned that courts can avoid the pitfall of inquiring into the controversial realm of legislative history by adhering to the plain meaning of
a statute. 89 In Lamie, the Court set a high standard for claims of ambiguities in statutes by holding that even if a phrase is awkward or
ungrammatical, it must be applied as written so long as the meaning is
straightforward and does not lead to an absurd result.90
B.

JudicialInterpretation of the Word "Shall" as
Opposed to the Word "May"

The Supreme Court held in Lexecon v. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad,

Hynes & Lerach that the word "shall" in statutory language normally
creates "an obligation impervious to judicial discretion."91 Unless
there is contrary legislative intent clearly expressed, the word "may"
ordinarily is construed as permissive or directory while the words
"must" and "shall" are deemed to be imperative or mandatory, leaving no option for the court, other than to apply the command of the
statute.92 Additionally, the presence of the words "may" and "shall"
in close proximity to one another indicates that Congress understood
the distinction between the two words and intended each to mean
what it says.93 Finally, the Supreme Court will apply "shall" as
mandatory even if there is a long-standing practice of applying the
rule or statute permissively.94
The only recognized exceptions to applying "shall" as mandatory
are either when doing so clearly goes against legislative intent and no
public benefit requires it to be given an imperative meaning, 95 or applying "shall" as mandatory will render the statute or rule unconstitutional. 96 In both of these scenarios, a number of state courts have held
86. Id. at 240-41.
87. Id. at 241.
88. Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004).
89. Id.
90. See id. at 534-35.
91. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35

(1998).
92. 82 C.J.S. Statutes: Construction of May and Shall § 368 n.79 (1999 & Supp.
2009).
93. Id. § 368.
94. Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 35.
95. C.J.S. Statutes: Construction of May and Shall, supra note 91.
96. 82 C.J.S. Determination of Legislative Intent § 369 n.4 (1999).
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the word "shall" to be permissive. 97 A mandatory application of the
word "shall" goes against legislative intent if a permissive application
is necessary to accomplish an intended legislative purpose.9 8 Courts
will apply a permissive interpretation of the word "shall" if a
mandatory interpretation will render the statute or rule unconstitutional and a permissive interpretation will not.9 9 Absent these rare
situations, statutory language providing that the court "shall" take
some action is to be interpreted to mean that the court has no discretion to refrain once the party seeking relief has fulfilled the statutory
requirements. 10 0
C. Plain Meaning of the Word "Shall" Applied to § 1307(b)
In Code § 1307(b), the language provides that the court "shall" dismiss upon request by the debtor.1" 1 Several courts adopting the majority position start and end their inquiry with the plain meaning of
the statute. 2 All courts adopting the majority position have held that
the plain meaning of "shall" was at least prominent in determining
that Code § 1307(b) gives the chapter 13 debtor an absolute right to
dismiss his case.'0 3 In Code § 1307(b), Congress unambiguously instructs courts to dismiss the debtor's chapter 13 case upon request by
the debtor, unless the case has previously been converted from another chapter. 10 4 Congress made its directive clear by qualifying an
exception to Code § 1307(b), being the limitation of a previous conversion from another chapter. 0 5 This is clear evidence that Congress
intended certain limitations, and if those limitations were not expressly stated, dismissal would be mandatory for the court. 10 6 Arguably, if Congress intended to limit a debtor's right to dismiss his case
under Code § 1307(b) when a motion to convert has been filed, it
would have expressly provided for such limitation in the statute.0 7
Further indication that Congress intended "shall" to be mandatory
in Code § 1307(b) is its use of the word "may" in Code sections
97. Id.
JUR. 2D Statutes § 17 (2009), 17 NYJUR STATUTES § 17 (Westlaw).
99. C.J.S. Statutes: Construction of May and Shall, supra note 91, § 368 n.4.
100. N.Y. JUR. 2D Statutes, supra note 97, § 17 n.9.

98. 97 N.Y.

101. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) (2006).
102. See In re Sickel, No. 08-00309, 2008 WL 5076981, at *1 (Bankr. D.D.C. Sept.
26, 2008); Barbieri v. Raj Acquisition Corp. (In re Barbieri), 199 F.3d 616, 619-20 (2d

Cir. 1999) (holding that the plain meaning of "shall" in 1307(b) was controlling and
was a reflection of legislative intent).
103. See In re Polly, 392 B.R. 236, 239 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2008); In re Patton, 209
B.R. 98, 101 (E.D. Tenn. 1997); In re Harper-Elder, 184 BR. 403, 404 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1995).
104. Polly, 392 B.R. at 240 & n.6.
105. Patton, 209 B.R. at 101.
106. Id.
107. See id. (stating that based on the plain language of subsection (b), the court
concludes that Congress intended a debtor's dismissal motion to prevail over a creditor's competing motion to convert).
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1307(a) and (c). 10 8 Code sections 1307(a) and (c) are in the same stat-

ute as Code § 1307(b), which is a close proximity."°9 This distinction
indicates that Congress intended subsection (b) to be a mandatory directive while subsections (a) and (c) were to be permissive.
Construing the word "shall" in Code § 1307(b) to be mandatory,
even in the face of a Code § 1307(c) motion to convert, will not render
Code § 1307(b) unconstitutional." 0 In fact, both House and Senate
reports indicate that in amending the Bankruptcy Act in 1978, Congress was concerned with the involuntary servitude implications of requiring a debtor to work for the benefit of his creditors if the debtor
could not opt out whenever he so desired."' Courts have articulated
that the right of the debtor to opt out should operate to avoid involuntary servitude." 2 From the congressional history as well as several
bankruptcy courts, it appears more likely that construing "shall" in
Code § 1307(b) to be permissive rather than mandatory for a court
will have constitutional implications.
Some courts espousing the minority position disagree, concluding
that 1307(b) is merely a statutory shield against involuntary servitude,
not against a liquidation proceeding. 1 13 These courts contend that liquidation does not involve involuntary servitude, so refusing to dismiss
upon the debtor's request when there is a competing motion to convert the chapter 13 case to one under chapter 7 will not have involuntary servitude implications." 4 Either the case will be converted to a
chapter 7 liquidation of assets or the court will dismiss the case. 115 It
is quite possible that § 1307(b) provides more protection against involuntary servitude than is necessary in that not every circumstance in
which the court could refuse the debtor's motion to dismiss would result in involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. At a minimum, interpreting "shall" in Code § 1307(b) as
mandatory will not render the statute unconstitutional.
A court adopting the minority position has used a similar plain-language argument, asserting that the plain language of Code § 1307(c)
could not be applied if the court had to grant the debtor's Code
§ 1307(b) motion to dismiss in the face of a motion to convert under
1307(c)." 6 Specifically, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District
of Texas opined in Jacobsen that Code § 1307(c) has effect "except as
108. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1307(a), (c) (West 2004 & Supp. 2009).
109. Id.
110. Bufford & Chemerinksy, supra note 1, at 31.
111. Id.
112. FitzSimmons v. Walsh (In re FitzSimmons), 20 B.R. 237, 240 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1982); In re Spencer, 137 B.R. 506, 513 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992); In re Noonan, 17
B.R. 793, 799-800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1982).
113. In re Jacobsen, 378 B.R. 805, 810 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 111.
116. Id.
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provided in subsection (e) of Code § 1307." 1" Code § 1307(c) does
not expressly carve out a separate exception for (b) of Code § 1307,
and to not give effect to a motion made under Code § 1307(c) because
of a subsequent motion under Code § 1307(b) would be reading in an
exception not expressed in the statutory language. 118 This argument,
however, does not take into account the changes made to Code § 1307
by the 2005 BAPCPA amendments. 1 9 Prior to the 2005 BAPCPA
amendments, Code § 1307(e) provided that the court could not convert a case under a chapter in which the debtor was not eligible.12 0 In
2005, Congress inserted a new subsection between the previous subsection (e) and subsection (d), which is now the new subsection (e)
and provides that the court shall dismiss or convert the chapter 13
case to a chapter 7 upon the debtor's failure to file a tax return under
Code § 1308.121 Upon adding the new subsection (e) in 2005, Congress did not amend subsection (c). 112 Whereas before it was clear
that Congress intended to limit the court's power to convert a chapter
13 case depending on the debtor's eligibility under other chapters, it is
inconsistent to assume the new subsection (e) is an intended limitation. 123 The new subsection (e) is a command to the court to dismiss
or convert a case, and the language of subsection (c) in relevant part
makes an exception to the court's power to convert a case. For this
reason, at least one court adopting the majority position found the
language of Code § 1307(e) to be irrelevant in construing the interaction of subsections (b) and (c). 2 4
V.

LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND THE VOLUNTARY NATURE OF
CHAPTER 13: A STRONG INDICATION THAT THE DEBTOR
SHOULD HAVE AN UNCONDITIONAL RIGHT TO
DIsMIss His CHAPTER 13 CASE

In 1978, Congress expressly affirmed its intent that chapter 13 be
purely voluntary for the debtor.12 5 The committee report, as well as
the laws codified manifested Congress's intent. 2 6 Congress expressly
rejected an involuntary chapter 13 proceeding as well as a provision
that would deny "straight" bankruptcy relief to debtors qualifying for
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. In re Polly, 329 B.R. 236, 242 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2008).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id. (noting that subsection (e) is a qualitatively different sort of limitation
than that under subsection (f)).
124. Id. (citing In re Jacobsen, 378 B.R. 805, 810 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007).
125. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 120 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6080.
126. COLLIER, supra note 2, 1 1300.41 & n.5.
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chapter 13 relief.127 Specific provisions in the Code also indicate Congress's intent that chapter 13 be completely voluntary.128 The Code
specifically provides that involuntary cases may be commenced under
chapters 7 and 11 only, and in a chapter 13 proceeding, only the
debtor may propose a plan. 129 Courts adopting the majority position
have found that because Congress intended chapter 13 to be completely voluntary, the debtor's right to dismiss under Code § 1307(b)
is unconditional, even when there is a pending motion to convert
under Code § 1307(c). 3 ° Specifically, if the court could grant a motion to convert under Code § 1307(c) and deny a competing motion
under Code § 1307(b), courts would seriously infringe on the debtor's
right to choose between liquidation and debt adjustment, and courts
would give creditors a method of circumventing the statutory requirements 1of3 1 initiating an involuntary proceeding against the unwilling
debtor.

A. Legislative Intent That Chapter 13 be Completely Voluntary
In reforming the Bankruptcy Act in 1978, the House Judiciary Committee of the 90th Congress firmly rejected the idea of mandatory or
involuntary chapter 13.132 Congress rejected an involuntary form of
chapter 13 because it feared that "forcing an individual to work for his
creditors would violate the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition
against involuntary servitude.' ' 133 Congress also rejected an involuntary chapter 13 by reasoning that an unwilling debtor is less likely to
retain his job or to cooperate in the repayment plan, which would result in bad public policy. 3 4 Congress even rejected the idea of denying "straight" (chapter 7) bankruptcy relief to individual debtors who
qualified for relief under chapter 13.'35 Opponents of denying straight
bankruptcy relief to debtors qualifying for chapter 13 relief argued
that "fulfillment of a debtor's commitment made pursuant to a chapter 13 plan requires not merely a debtor's consent ...

but a positive

determination by him and his family to live within the constraints imposed by the plan during its entire term and a will to persevere with
the plan to the end."'1 36 Congress intended for debtors to file for relief
under chapter 13 not just because it was the only type of bankruptcy
127. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 120.
128. COLLIER, supra note 2, 1300.41 & n.7.
129. 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), 1321 (2006).
130. See Barbieri v. Raj Acquisition Corp. (In re Barbieri), 199 F.3d 616, 620 (2d
Cir. 1999) (citing several other decisions in discussing congressional intent being furthered by holding that Code § 1307(b) conferred an unconditional right).
131. See, e.g., In re Patton, 209 B.R. 98, 102 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1997).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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relief available to them, but because they were willing to live within
the constraints of the proposed plan in order to keep their assets and
at the same time repay their creditors with future earnings.1 37
Congressional intent that chapter 13 be completely voluntary materialized into several provisions in the Code.13 8 Specifically, Code
§ 303(a) provides that an involuntary case may be commenced under
chapters 7 and 11, but not chapter 13.139 Code § 1321(a) provides, in
relevant part, that only a debtor may propose a chapter 13 plan, not
the creditors or the court.1 4 ° In contrast, under chapter 11, somebody
other than the debtor may file a plan after the debtor's exclusivity
period has run. 4 ' Finally, Congress provided for a method under
chapter 11 in which an involuntary case may be commenced against an
individual with regular income that is eligible for chapter 13 relief, but
no such method is available under chapter 13.142 The statutory construction of the former Bankruptcy Act of 1978 is a further indication
that Congress intended chapter 13 to be completely voluntary. 4 3
B. The Completely Voluntary Nature of Chapter 13 as an Indication
of Legislative Intent that the Debtor Have an UnconditionalRight to
Dismiss Under Code § 1307(b)
Many courts adopting the majority position have reasoned that
Congress intended for Code § 1307(b) to give a chapter 13 debtor an
unconditional right to dismiss because Congress expressed its intent
that chapter 13 proceedings be entirely voluntary.1 44 Specifically,
courts assert that to restrict a debtor's unqualified right of dismissal
under chapter 13 would significantly depart from chapter 13 legislative
history.' 4 5 Involuntary conversion to a case under a different chapter
would largely compromise the voluntary nature of chapter 13. An example of how Congress has traditionally dealt with the possibility of
involuntary conversion was under former § 666 of the Bankruptcy Act
and Rule 13-112(a)(2), which provided that the court could not convert a case from chapter XIII to chapter VII 14 6 without the debtor's
written consent.' 4 7 This former provision illustrates Congress's intent
137. Id. at 121.

1300.41 & n.7.
COLLIER, supra note 2,
139. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2006).
140. 11 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006); S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 138 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5924.
141. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2006).
142. See COLLIER, supra note 2, 1300.41 & n.5.
143. See Barbieri v. Raj Acquisition Corp. (In re Barbieri), 199 F.3d 616, 620 (2d
Cir. 1999).
144. Tidewater Fin. Co. v. Williams, 498 F.3d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 2007); see also In re
Patton, 209 B.R. 98, 102 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1997); Barbieri, 199 F.3d at 619-20.
145. Patton, 209 B.R. at 102.
146. See Bufford & Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 30. "Chapter VII" is the Bankruptcy Act (pre-1978) predecessor of the current Chapter 7. Id.
147. Patton, 209 B.R. at 102.
138.
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that the debtor, and only the debtor, could choose between debt adjustment under chapter XIII and liquidation under chapter VII. 1 48
Even though written consent is no longer needed for conversion, Congressional intent that the debtor be able to choose between a chapter
13 and chapter 7 by having a guaranteed right of dismissal is still present. 149 Also, under the former Bankruptcy Act, Congress saw the
forced sale of a wage-earner's property in a liquidation proceeding to
be too severe to impose involuntarily. 50 Congress could only have
preserved the debtor's freedom to choose between debt adjustment
and liquidation by giving the debtor a guaranteed right of dismissal. 15 '
Another major argument asserted by courts adopting the majority
position is that considering a Code § 1307(c) motion to convert notwithstanding a Code § 1307(b) motion to dismiss would effectively allow creditors to circumvent the statutory requirements of Code
§ 303(b) for an involuntary filing.' 52 An involuntary filing can be
made against an individual under chapters 7 and 11.113 Such filing,
however, must be made by three or more entities each of which "is
either a holder of a claim against [the debtor] that is not contingent to
liability

. .

." and "if such claims aggregate at least $12,300 more than

the value of any lien on property of the debtor securing such claims
held by the holders of such claims."'15 4 Basically, there must be at
least three unsecured creditors with claims in the aggregate of $13,475
or more that join in the involuntary petition. 55 Also, if the debtor has
less than twelve unsecured creditors, a single creditor with a claim of
$13,475 or more can file an involuntary petition.' 56 A creditor that
can proceed in transferring a chapter 13 case to one under chapter 7
against a debtor that has made a motion to dismiss is effectively filing
an involuntary chapter 7 petition without having to conform to the
requirements specified in Code § 303(b). 57 Congress codified a procedure for creditors to force an unwilling debtor into a chapter 7 case,
and set forth specific requirements that creditors must fulfill in order
to do so. 158 With the specific procedure and requirements for the filing of an involuntary chapter 7 codified in Code § 303(b), it is unlikely
that Congress intended for creditors to be able to force an unwilling
debtor into a chapter 7 case by any other method.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
See id. (citing In re Hearn, 18 B.R. 605, 606 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982)).
Hearn, 18 B.R. at 606.
Id.
Patton, 209 B.R. at 102.
11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2006).
Id.
EPSTEIN, supra note 33, at 140.
Id.
Patton, 209 B.R. at 102.
Id.
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CONSEQUENCES OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL AND REMEDIES
VI.
AVAILABLE TO THE COURT AS SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT ABUSE OF

THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM WITHOUT DENYING THE DEBTOR
HIS UNCONDITIONAL RIGHT TO DISMISS

The primary concern for courts adopting the minority position is
that courts will be unable to prevent bankruptcy abuse if dismissal
upon request is an unconditional right.15 9 Specifically, these courts
have expressed concern that if the debtor's right to dismiss is unconditional, he will be able to evade the consequences of abuses of the
bankruptcy process enumerated under Code § 1307(c). 160 However,
there are several undesirable consequences of dismissing a chapter 13
case. In the present case, dismissal will result in the debtor's loss of
protection of the automatic stay and the possibility of receiving a discharge. 1 6 ' Additionally, the debtor's remedies will be limited to those
available in state court, and he stands to lose protection of the automatic stay if he refiles within a year after dismissal of his original
case. 162 The Code gives the court other methods of preventing abuse
by allowing it to dismiss the debtor's case with prejudice to refiling
and exercise continuing control over the debtor's property. 163 The
court can also impose sanctions, and refer ill-motivated debtors that
abuse the bankruptcy
process to the United States Attorney for crimi64
nal prosecution.1
A. Loss of Protection of the Automatic Stay as Well as the
Possibility of a Discharge in the Present Case, Debtor Remedies
Limited to State Court, and the Heightened Burden for Protection of
the Automatic Stay Placed Upon the Serial Filer as Negative
Consequences of Voluntary Dismissal
Upon filing a bankruptcy petition, a stay is immediately and automatically imposed that effectively stays commencement or continuation of judicial, administrative, or other collection actions against the
debtor including the recovery for any claim arising before the petition
was filed.' 6 5 Even though the stay does not prevent criminal, domes159.
160.
1991).
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

In re Polly, 392 B.R. 236, 244 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2008).
Kirshenbaum Inv. Co. v. Gaudet (In re Gaudet), 132 B.R. 670, 674 (D.R.I.

In re Harper-Elder, 184 B.R. 403, 407 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1995).
Id.
Polly, 392 B.R. at 245.
Harper-Elder,184 B.R. at 406-07.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) reads:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section
5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, operates as a stay,
applicable to all entities, of(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or pro-
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tic support, certain medical, tax, or civil proceedings involving domestic violence,' 66 its protection is extremely broad.' 6 7 Congress intended
the automatic stay to be very protective of the debtor's estate because
it is an important element of the individual debtor's fresh start, and in
liquidation proceedings, it prevents certain creditors from obtaining
preferential treatment by quick action. 1 68 The debtor's protection by
the automatic stay under Code § 362 terminates at the earliest point
that certain property ceases to be property of the estate, the case is
closed, discharge is granted or denied, or the case is dismissed. 6 9
When the debtor voluntarily dismisses his chapter 13 case under Code
§ 1307(b), he loses protection from the stay under Code § 362.170 Voluntary dismissal under Code § 1307(b) effectively subjects the debtor
to the collection proceedings and attempts previously prevented by
the stay. 17 1 Additionally, Code § 108(c) protects creditors against the
possibility that a debtor can file a chapter 13 petition and voluntarily
dismiss right after the statute of limitations has run on the collection
action.1 72 Code § 108(c) tolls the statute of limitations on a civil cause
of action viable on the date of filing until 30 days after the creditor has
73
been notified that the stay has been terminated by dismissal.'

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

ceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced
before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title;
the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate,
of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under
this title;
any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
any act to collect, asses, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the
debtor; and
the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United
States Tax Court concerning a corporate debtor's tax liability for a
taxable period the bankruptcy court may determine or concerning the
tax liability of a debtor who is an individual for a taxable period ending before the date of the order for relief under this title.

11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006).
166.
167.
6135.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. § 362(b).
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 174 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1)-(2).
In re Harper-Elder, 184 B.R. 403, 407 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Therefore, collection actions available at the time of the petition can
be used against the debtor upon his voluntary dismissal under Code
§ 1307(b).
The debtor's calculated current monthly income and his current
monthly expenses will typically determine the length of the plan he
proposes. Completion of the approved chapter 13 plan or a hardship
under Code § 1328(b) will amount to a discharge of most, if not all
debts. 174 So long as the plan involves a commitment of all of the
debtor's disposable income to repayment of debts and the unsecured
creditors receive the value of the amount they stood to receive in a
chapter 7 liquidation, the debtor is discharged usually by only having
to pay a ratable amount of the total owed to his creditors.1 7 5 In most
chapter 13 cases, the requirement in Code § 1325(a)(4), that the creditors receive the value they would receive in a chapter 7 liquidation, is
easy to satisfy because in the typical liquidation, unsecured creditors
receive little, if anything.' 76 Therefore, most chapter 13 debtors are in
a position to be discharged without having to pay the exact amount
owed upon commencement of the case. If, however, the chapter 13
case is dismissed before completion of the approved plan, the amounts
owed by the debtor to his creditors are restored to those existing at
that has tranthe commencement of the case. 177 Basically, everything
178
spired during the bankruptcy process is undone.
As compared to state courts, federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction to apply the Code have much more power to protect the debtor
from collection efforts of creditors. 1 7 9 The only viable state court alternatives to federal bankruptcy are either an assignment for the benefit of creditors (ABC) 180 or a receivership, which, like an ABC, is a
turnover of property. 18 ' In an ABC or receivership, the debtor makes
a voluntary transfer of all of his assets in trust for liquidation and pro
rata distribution to the creditors. 8 ABCs originated from common
law, but are now governed by statute in most states.' 83 ABCs are
state law equitable remedies, and accordingly, may not provide for a
discharge of debts because such provisions in ABCs are preempted by
federal law as conflicting with the federal purpose of enacting uniform
174. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1328 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009). But see 11 U.S.C. § 523

(2006).
175. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(a)(4), (b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2009).

176.

EPSTEIN,

supra note 33, at 379.

177. Harper-Elder,184 B.R. at 407.
178. Id.
179. See In re Hearn, 18 B.R. 605, 606 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982) (explaining that if the
debtor has chosen to dismiss his Chapter 13 case, he must be prepared to limit his
rights and remedies to those available in state court).
180. 17 TEX. JUR. 3D Creditors Rights & Remedies § 69 (2009).
181. See, e.g., TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 64.001 (Vernon 2008).
182. See TEX. JUR. 3D Creditors Rights & Remedies, supra note 179.

183. Id.
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bankruptcy proceedings.184 The key differences between ABCs and
receiverships, and chapter 13 of the Code are the impossibility of the
debtor to receive a discharge, and that ABCs and receiverships are
purely liquidation proceedings, whereas chapter 13 does not require
liquidation of the debtor's assets.185 The debtor has, for the time being, effectively limited "his rights and remedies to those available
in
186
state court" if he voluntarily dismisses his chapter 13 case.
The 2005 BAPCPA changes to the Code brought a specific amendment to curb the desirability of serial filing of bankruptcy cases and
limit the "revolving door" approach to bankruptcy. 87 Specifically,
Code § 362(c)(3) terminates protection of the automatic stay on the
30th day after filing for a debtor that had, in the preceding year, a case
pending that was subsequently dismissed. 88 In this situation, an interested party must make a motion to extend the stay and the court must
find that the debtor filed the case in good faith as to the creditors to
be stayed in order for the stay to last beyond the 30 days after filing of
the subsequent petition.' 89 A case filed by a debtor less than one year
after his previous case was dismissed will presumptively be viewed as
filed in bad faith. This presumption may only be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence found in the criteria enumerated under
§ 362(c)(3)(C)(i)(II)J 90 If the debtor has two or more cases pending
within the previous year that were dismissed, then no stay goes into
effect. 191 Therefore, a debtor who voluntarily dismisses his case will
experience a heightened burden to receive protection from the stay if
he chooses to re-file his case within the same year.1 92 The repeat
debtor, however, will immediately or shortly after filing lose protection from the stay unless he can come forward with clear and convincing evidence to show why the stay should be imposed. 1 93
B. The Bankruptcy Court's Ability to Dismiss the Debtor's Case
With Prejudice, Exercise Continuing Control Over Property of the
Estate, Impose Sanctions, and Initiate Criminal Prosecution as
Sufficient Remedies to Prevent Bankruptcy Abuse

Many courts adopting the minority position express concern that if
the debtor has an unconditional right to his case in the face of a pend184. MSR Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 74 F.3d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 1996).
185. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1328, 1306 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009).
186. In re Harper-Elder, 184 B.R. 403, 407 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1995).
187. Robin Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer ProtectionAct of 2005, 2005 A.L.R. FED. 2D 3
§ 11 (2005).
188. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(3) (West Supp. 2009).

189. Id. § 362(c)(3)(B).
190.
191.
192.
193.

Miller, supra note 186, § 11.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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ing motion to convert, the court will be unable to remedy bankruptcy
abuse.1 94 There are, however, several provisions in the Code that give
the court wide discretion to remedy this misconduct.19 5 Thus, denying
a debtor's motion to dismiss under Code § 1307(b) when a motion to
convert under Code § 1307(c) is pending is not the only possible remedy the court has in protecting creditors against abuse of the bankruptcy process.1 96 Most importantly, the court may dismiss the
chapter 13 case with prejudice to refiling pursuant to Code § 349(a). 197
Code § 349(a) provides, in relevant part, that "unless the court orders
otherwise, the dismissal of a case under this title does not bar the discharge, in a later case under this title, of debts that were dischargeable
in the case dismissed."' 198 Courts have acknowledged that the "unless
the court orders otherwise" language under Code § 349(a) gives them
considerable latitude in conditioning dismissal under Code § 1307(b)
as well. 199 Conditioning dismissal by using Code § 349(a) is a way in
which courts can prevent the "revolving door to bankruptcy" abuse."
Similar to the court's ability to dismiss the debtor's case under Code
§ 1307(b) with prejudice, the court also has the express power to exercise continuing control over property of an estate after the case has
been dismissed.2 0 ' Code § 349(b) provides, in relevant part, that "unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of a case ... (3)
re-vests the property of the estate in the entity in which such property
was vested immediately before commencement of the case under this
title."20 2 Code § 349(b) gives the court the considerable discretion to
exercise continuing control over property of the estate after dismissal
if such control is necessary to protect creditors against the debtor's
post-dismissal conduct.20 3
Dismissal under Code § 1307(b) does not relieve the debtor from
the consequences of his misconduct. 2 4 Even if the debtor voluntarily
dismisses, the court retains the power to impose sanctions under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 9011.205 Rule 9011 gives the
court the authority to impose sanctions on motion by an interested
party, or sua sponte if the debtor or debtor's attorney files a paper to
194. Kirshenbaum Inv. Co. v. Gaudet (In re Gaudet), 132 B.R. 670, 674 (D.R.I.
1991).
195. See In re Polly, 392 B.R. 236, 245 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2008) (explaining that
§1307(c) is not the only possible protection against the ill-motivated debtor).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 11 U.S.C.A. § 349(a) (2006).
199. Polly, 392 B.R. at 245; In re Greenberg, 200 B.R. 763, 770 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1996).
200. Polly, 392 B.R. at 245.
201. Id.
202. 11 U.S.C. § 349(b).
203. Polly, 392 B.R. at 245.
204. Id. at 246.
205. Id.
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the court that is for "any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause
unnecessary delay or needlessly increase the cost of litigation."2 °6
This remedy is available to the court if the debtor uses chapter 13
solely to delay or prevent his creditors from proceeding against
him.2"7 The court's imposition of sanctions is an exercise of the
court's inherent police power to prevent the proscribed conduct described in rule 9011.208 The imposition of sanctions after the debtor
has voluntarily dismissed does not impinge on the debtor's unconditional right to dismiss under Code § 1307(b).2 °9 Therefore, the debtor
is not in a position to evade the imposition of sanctions by invoking
his right to dismiss under Code § 1307(b).210
In addition to the imposition of sanctions under rule 9011, the court
or an interested party may refer the debtor's conduct to the United
States Attorney's Office for investigation and potential criminal prosecution. 211 Sections 151-57 of Title 18 provide for criminal prosecution when a debtor commits bankruptcy fraud.212 Specifically § 157
provides:
A person who, having devised or intending to devise a scheme or
artifice to defraud and for the purpose of executing or concealing
such scheme or artifice or attempting to do so ...files a petition
under Title 11 [the Code] ...shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.213
Section 158 gives bankruptcy courts the duty to establish procedures for referring cases containing violations under § 157.214 Title 18
provides a serious tool at the disposal of the bankruptcy court in
preventing debtors from using the bankruptcy process to defraud their
creditors. 2 15 Like the imposition of sanctions, the court can use the
procedure granted under Title 18 and refer a case of possible bankruptcy 6 fraud even after the debtor has voluntarily dismissed his
case.

21

206. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
207. See In re Dilley, 125 B.R. 189, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991).
208. In re Harper-Elder, 184 B.R. 403, 406-07 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1995).
209. Id. at 407.
210. Id. But see In re Gaudet, 132 B.R. 670, 676 (D.R.I. 1991).
211. Barbieri v. Raj Acquisition Corp. (In re Barbieri), 199 F.3d 616, 621-22 (2d
Cir. 1999).
212. Id.
213. 18 U.S.C.A. § 157 (West Supp. 2009).
214. 18 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (West Supp. 2009).
215. See Barbieri, 199 F.3d at 621-22.
216. See id.
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COURTS SHOULD INTERPRET CODE

MANDATORY BECAUSE AS CHAPTER
SINCE THE

2005 BAPCPA

13

§ 1307(b)

319

AS

FILINGS HAVE INCREASED

AMENDMENTS,

UNIFORMITY IN

INTERPRETATION THAT COMPORTS WITH THE PLAIN
MEANING OF THE STATUTE IS CRUCIAL

The 2005 BAPCPA addition of the means test operated to push
many debtors from chapter 7 to chapter 13, or out of the bankruptcy
system all together.2 1 7 The idea was that debtors with an income
above the median had some ability to repay their creditors, and
should at least pursue a court-approved plan to do so. 2 1 8 The result
would be a drop in "can-pay abusers" of the bankruptcy system and a
greater return to creditors.2 1 9 The proportion of chapter 13 filings in
fact increased along with the total number of bankruptcy filings.2 20 In
2008, bankruptcy filings increased 29 percent from the previous year,
up to nearly 1 million and are expected to exceed that number this
year.22 1 With bankruptcy filings to be at an expected 1.2 million ,222 it
is crucial that courts interpret Code § 1307(b) as an unconditional
right, even in the event of a pending motion to convert, because doing
so will produce certainty in this right and encourage willing debtors to
repay their creditors under a chapter 13 plan.
A.

Since the 2005 BAPCPA Amendments, and Most Noticeably in
2008, Chapter 13 Filings Have Substantially Increased

The means test, ushered in by BAPCPA, effectively forced debtors
with above-median incomes out of chapter 7 and in to chapter 13, or
out of the bankruptcy system.2 23 Congress intended for the means test
to push the debtors that could pay out of chapter 7 and into chapter
13.224 As intended, application of the means test in fact caused a pronounced change in the distribution of chapter 7 and chapter 13
cases.2 25 Pre-BAPCPA chapter 7 filings made up 71 percent of all
consumer bankruptcy filings, decreasing to only 57 percent in the first
year after the BAPCPA amendments became effective. 2 6 In the same
period, chapter 13 filings increased from 29 percent to 42 percent of
all filings.2 27
217. See Lawless, supra note 20, at 352-53.
218. Id. at 352.
219. Id.
220. See Flynn & Crewson, supra note 2, at 65; Ben Rooney, Bankruptcy Filings
Surge to 1 Million- Up 29%, CNN Money.corn, Aug. 27, 2008, http://www.money.cnn.
com/2008/08/27/news/economy/bankruptcy.
221. Rooney, supra note 219.
222. Id.
223. Lawless, supra note 20, at 356.
224. Id. at 357.
225. Flynn & Crewson, supra note 2, at 65.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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All throughout the 2000s, American families have experienced increasing economic pressure as median incomes have declined and basic expenses have risen. 228 Defaults on credit cards and car loans, as
well as mortgage foreclosures, have soared since 2000.229 These facts
have resulted in bankruptcy filings surging to nearly one million in the
past year ending June 30, 2008.230 During this period, total bankruptcy filings increased by 29 percent, while chapter 13 filings alone
increased by 17 percent.2 3 1 With the economy spiraling downward,
particularly due to the subprime mortgage crisis, scholars at the
American Bankruptcy Institute expect filings to reach 1.2 million in
2009.232

B. Interpreting Code § 1307(b) as Discretionary When There is a
Code § 1307(c) Motion Pending Will Increase Bankruptcy Litigation,
and Possibly Deter Otherwise Willing Debtors
With consumer bankruptcies expected to exceed I million in 2009, it
is especially important for courts to give effect to the plain meaning of
statutes when possible. This practice will make the bankruptcy process more predictable and efficient for the debtor. If Code § 1307(b)
is given mandatory effect, even in a situation where there is a pending
motion under Code § 1307(c), there will be no uncertainty for the
debtor about his right to opt out, and less possible litigation. The
debtor will not have to worry about being forced into a chapter 7 liquidation in the course of his voluntary chapter 13 proceeding if he
knows he can voluntarily dismiss his case at any point. If the debtor
knows he is free to opt out at any point, he is more likely to file a
chapter 13 petition and work to pay his creditors over time, which is a
preferable solution to the creditors as well.23 3 Because chapter 13 allows a debtor with some form of income to retain his assets, including
those encumbered by a lien, 234 it is usually the best option for the
insolvent debtor. Also, if courts uniformly adopt the majority position, litigation will not be necessary to resolve competing motions
under Code sections 1307(b) and (c). With fewer issues proceeding to
litigation, the perspective cost of chapter 13 bankruptcy is less likely to
discourage the willing debtor.23 5 In the interest of curbing home fore228. Lawless, supra note 20, at 349.
229. Id. at 350.
230. Rooney, supra note 219.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. S. REp. No. 5-989, at 12 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 787, 5798.
234. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1322, 1325 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009).
235. See generally William F. Stone, Jr., & Bryan A. Stark, The Treatment of Attorneys' Fee Retainers in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy and the Problem of Denying Compensation to Debtors' Attorneys for Post-Petition Legal Services They Are Obliged to
Render, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 551, 581-82 (2008) (discussing consumer debtors' attorneys' ability to bill for post-petition legal services; namely, litigating contested
matters).
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closures, repossessions, and loss of valuable assets and at the same
time maximizing the return to creditors through the bankruptcy process, courts should interpret Code § 1307(b) as an unconditional right
for the debtor so as to encourage chapter 13 filings over chapter 7
filings, and decrease the amount of litigation.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The plain meaning doctrine and Supreme Court interpretation of
the word "shall" is a strong indication to courts that Code § 1307(b)
leaves no room for discretion, even when there is a pending motion to
convert under § 1307(c). The interpretation of Code § 1307(b), that
the debtor is free to opt out whenever he chooses, is consistent with
Congress's intent that chapter 13 be completely voluntary. The concern expressed by some courts that an unconditional right to dismiss
will deprive the court of its inherent power and lead to abuse is misplaced. The debtor does not necessarily put himself in a more preferable position by voluntarily dismissing his chapter 13 case.
Additionally, bankruptcy courts have codified remedies to punish
abuses by the ill-motivated debtor other than denying the debtor's
motion to dismiss. Finally, as bankruptcy filings increase to unprecedented numbers, it is vitally important to minimize the increasing rate
at which homes are foreclosed upon, property is repossessed, and assets are seized, and at the same time, put creditors in a position at
which their recovery is maximized through the bankruptcy process. In
light of these factors, courts should strongly consider adopting the majority position articulated in Polly, that "upon request by the debtor at
any time, the court shall dismiss," even if there is a pending motion to
convert the case to one under chapter 7.
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